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Legal Pluralism? Indigenous Rights as Legal Constructs  
 
1. Introduction 
Both in domestic and in international law, the last twenty-five years have witnessed a 
general trend towards the recognition and increased protection of the rights ascribed to 
indigenous peoples, especially when such peoples form minority populations within the 
bounds of sovereign states. This is a legal process of high importance, which has 
gathered global momentum, and which is changing the established legal and political 
structure of many societies. Moreover, the same period has witnessed the consolidation 
of a broadly dominant theoretical model for explaining, justifying and asserting 
indigenous rights. That is, this period has witnessed the emergence of a particular 
model of legal pluralism to account for indigenous rights. Research on legal pluralism of 
itself forms a diffuse and widening sub-discipline of legal inquiry, and it has branched 
into a range of separate lines, each stressing the importance of informal law outside the 
domain of state law.1 However, a distinctive variant on the theory of legal pluralism has 
acquired pervasive influence in conceptual reflections on indigenous rights. This is 
especially evident in Latin America. In some Latin American countries, this model has 
become a part of relevant constitutional law and jurisprudence.2  
 
In general, this model of legal pluralism is designed to support claims to indigenous 
rights by proposing a distinctively sociological account of the origins and the validity of 
such rights. In fact, this model contains two separate sociological dimensions. 
 
First, the model of legal pluralism applied to indigenous communities is founded, 
generally, in the standard socio-anthropological claim that societies containing multiple 
ethnic communities contain multiple legal systems, some of which are linked to 
communities with claims to indigeneity: that such societies contain a ‘polycentric 
                                                          
1 See classical examples in Marc Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law’ 
(1981) 48 J. Legal Plur. Unoff. Law 1; Robert C. Ellickson, ‘Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among 
Neighbors in Shasta County’ (1986) 38:3 Stanf. Law Rev 623. 
2 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision C-030/08, holding that Colombian law represents a ‘multicultural and 
pluralist model’); Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia, Decision 1422/2012, declaring that the state is based 
on ‘pluralism, interculturality, and decolonization’. For comments see Kirsten Anker, Declarations of Independence: A 
Legal Pluralist Approach to Indigenous Rights (Farnham: Ashgate 2014) 87. 




universe’ of legal norms.3 On this account, the existence of diverse legal systems implies 
that different groups identify legal rights in different ways, and indigenous legal orders 
give rise to constructions of rights that may be at variance with the broader legal regime 
of society. This aspect of the pluralism model reproduces elements of long-established 
theories of post-colonial legality. It reflects the conviction that rights constructed in 
legal systems linked to indigeneity possess distinctive historical foundations, which 
have usually been suppressed by formal processes of legal centralization.4 Traditionally, 
the most forceful theorists of legal pluralism denounced the ‘myth’ and ‘ideology of legal 
centralism’, which they perceived as imposing a reductive normative system on the 
pluralistic social fields contained in post-colonial societies.5 In recent theories, this 
pluralist approach has been supplemented by a theory of ‘interlegality’, which 
accentuates the important role of legal hybridization, caused by the interaction between 
global law and indigenous law, in forming indigenous rights.6 In each perspective, 
indigenous law produces rights whose legitimacy results from the fact that they reflect 
historically embedded, although chronically marginalized, customs and life structures, 
and the assertion of such rights challenges the dominance of formalistic systems of 
national law.7 Owing to their originality and deep co-ordination with customary 
behavioural patterns, such rights are widely seen as possessing greater authenticity 
than mere law in books.8 One sociologist perceives indigenous rights as giving 
                                                          
3 Elisa Cruz Rueda, ‘Principios generales del derecho indígena’ in Rudolf Huber et al, eds, Hacia sistemas jurídicos 
plurales. Reflexiones y experiencias de coordinación entre el derecho estatal y el derecho indígena (Bogota: Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2008) 29-50; 29. 
4 This perspective is reflected in sociological and jurisprudential literature. See Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ 
(1988) 22:5 Law Soc. Rev 869 at 873 [Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’]; Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: 
Past to Present, Local to Global’ (2008) 30 Syd. Law Rev 375 at 390-399; Franz von Benda-Beckmann, 
Rechtspluralismus in Malawi: Geschichtliche Entwicklung und heutige Problematik (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1970) 64; M. 
B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) 2; 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’ (2002) 37 J. Legal Plur. Unoff. Law at 60. It is also 
at the core of some anthropological literature. See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology (New York: Fontana, 1983) 184.  
5 See John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 J. Legal Plur. Unoff. Law at 1. 
6 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 437 [de Sousa Santos, New Legal Common Sense]; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Heterogeneous State and 
Legal Pluralism in Mozambique’ (2006) 40(1) Law Soc. Rev 39 at 70; María Teresa Sierra, ‘Derecho indígena y 
acceso a la justicia en México: Perspectivas desde la interlegalidad’ (2005) 41 Revista  IIDH 287 at 310. See also 
Robert Albro, ‘Confounding Cultural Citizenship and Constitutional Reform in Bolivia’ (2010) 37:3 Latin American 
Perspectives 71 at 80. Our account differs from these theories in that it challenges the presumption that pluralism is 
based in existing legal norms and entitlements. 
7 See Raúl Prada Alcoreza, ‘Estado plurinacional comunitario autonómico y pluralismo jurídico’ in Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos & José Luis Exení Rodríguez, eds, Justicia indígena, plurinacionalidad e interculturalidad en Bolivia (Quito: 
Abya-Yala, 2012), 410.  
8 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada 
Law’ (1977) 12 Law Soc. Rev. See the original version of this argument in Eugen Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des 
Rechts, 4th edition (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1989[1913]. 




expression to a distinct and comprehensive indigenous value system, and as founding a 
‘distinct legal code, different from positive law and ordinary justice’.9 Even theories of 
indigenous rights that reject romantic approaches to legal pluralism understand 
indigenous rights as rights that are prior to the legal order of the nation state, 
possessing ‘a kind of historical precedence’ to the state – that is, as rights that 
indigenous peoples ‘had always enjoyed before they were taken away from them’.10 
 
Second, the model of legal pluralism that is used to explain indigenous rights derives 
some ideas from conflict-sociological accounts of legal mobilization.11 In this respect, the 
theory of legal pluralism concerned with indigenous law deviates from other lines of 
pluralistic theory, which have often expressed a lack of confidence in the law as a means 
of overarching social transformation.12 The pluralism model referring to indigenous 
rights typically indicates that litigation for collective rights consolidates new 
participatory patterns of citizenship and subject formation.13 Indeed, in this perspective, 
indigenous rights are seen as expressions of pluralistic modes of popular sovereignty or 
sub-national citizenship, and which reflect the demands for autonomy of different social 
groups in relation to more formally structured national legal orders.14 In this respect, 
the model of legal pluralism borrows elements from theories of social process litigation, 
                                                          
9 Simón Yampara Huarachi (Aymara researcher and advisor of the Foundation Qullana Suma Qamaña), Address at 
the Seminar on Law and Communitary Justice organized by the APPNOI-TARI-Community Pacha[kuti]: Cosmo-convivencia, 
Derecho y Justicia de los Pueblos Qullana (2005). Availiable at http://www.katari.org/pdf/justicia%20Qullana.pdf. 
10 See Sousa Santos, New Legal Common Sense, supra note 6 at 245. For a similar claim see Esther Sánchez Botero, 
‘Aproximación desde la antropología jurídica a la justicia de los pueblos indígenas’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
and Mauricio García Vilegas, eds, El caleidoscopo de las justicias en Colombia, vol. II (Bogota: Siglo de Hombre Ediores, 
2001) 186. 
11 See the account of indigenous rights as results of a ‘struggle for a collective law’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
‘El significado politico y jurídico de la jurisdicción indígena’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Mauricio García 
Vilegas (eds), El caleidoscopo de las justicias en Colombia, vol. II (Bogota: Siglo de Hombre Ediores, 2001) 208. For classic 
studies in this tradition see J. P. Nettl, Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (New York: 
Basic Books, 1967) 247: Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights. Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1974) 131; Michael McCann, ‘Law and Social Movements’ in Austin Sarat, ed, Blackwell 
Companion to Law and Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 508. 
12 Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, supra note 4 at 879. 
13 See Álvaro Bello, Etnicidad y ciudadanía en América Latina. La Acción colectiva de los pueblos indígenas (Santiago de Chile: 
CEPAL, 2004) 15 [Bello, Etnicidad y ciudadanía]. 
14 See Victoria Bomberry, ‘Refounding the Nation: A Generation of Activism in Bolivia’ (2008) 51:12 American 
Behavioural Scientist 1790; Donna Lee Van Cott, ‘A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia’ 
(2000) 32:1 Journal of Latin American Studies 207 at 207; Pascal Lupien, ‘The Incorporation of Indigenous 
Concepts of Plurinationality into the New Constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia’ (2011) 18(3) Democratization 774 
at 779; and Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America. The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal 
Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 55.  




claiming that legal mobilization consolidates the legal position and the sectoral 
citizenship of minority social groups.15  
 
There is much common ground between the two conceptual lineages that flow together 
in the pluralistic construction of indigenous rights. Both lines of analysis reflect the 
assumption that the formal law of national society prevents sectoral collectives from 
gaining full legal recognition. Both observe indigenous rights as the outcomes of 
demands for recognition for socially existing, but typically suppressed, group identities 
and collective practices. In both perspectives, the assertion of indigenous rights 
expresses a mode of contested citizenship, and the solidification of plural legal orders 
and plural rights appears as a process that either weakens, or reflects a weakening of, 
the sovereign power of state institutions and the dominance of formal legal norms.16     
 
This article sets out a critique of pluralistic constructions of indigenous rights. In 
particular, it questions the assumption that such rights are asserted by generically 
distinct subjects, and that they assume legitimacy because of their embeddedness in a 
legal order that has priority to formal national law.17 Moreover, it questions the related 
assumption that acknowledgement of such rights fragments formal law, or articulates 
legal norms that challenge the institutional foundations of formal law. 
 
                                                          
15 On some accounts the assertion of indigenous rights is simply classified as a ‘social process’: Bello, Etnicidad y 
ciudadanía, supra note 13 at 43. Some leading versions of legal pluralism accentuate collective litigation as a new 
mode of subject formation. See for example Antonio Carlos Wolkmer, Pluralismo jurídico. Fundamentos de uma nova 
cultura de Direito, third revised edition (Sao Paulo: Alfa Omega, 2001) 294 [Wolkmer, Pluralismo jurídico]. On litigation 
as a distinctive expression of citizenship, see Reva B. Siegel, ‘Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto Era’ (2006) 94:5 Calif. Law Rev 1323 at 1333; William N. 
Eskridge, ‘Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law’ (2001) 150:1 Univ. Pa. Law Rev 419 at 
454-458; Stephen C. Yeazell, ‘Brown, the Civil Rights Movement and the Silent Litigation Revolution’ (2004) 57:6 
Vand. L. Rev 1974 at 1990. 
16 For many variants on this claim see Wolkmer, Pluralismo jurídico, supra note 15 at 140; Antonio Carlos Wolkmer, 
‘Repensando a questão da historicidade do estado e do direito na América Latina’ (2006) 1:4 Panóptica 1:4 82 at 94. 
For an extreme position see the claim that legal pluralism linked to indigeneity ‘takes us to the limit’ of the common 
concept of the state, which is a ‘political form closed to the difference liberated by plurality’ in Salvador Schavelzon, 
Plurinacionalidad y. Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir. Dos conceptos leídos desde Bolivia y Ecuador post-constituyentes (Buenos Aires: 
CLACSO, 2015) 167. [Schavelzon, Plurinacionalidad]. Even milder versions of legal pluralism relating to indigenous 
rights view primary rights of indigenous people as mitigating the sovereign power of the state. See for example S. 
James Anaya & Sergio Puig, ‘Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples’ (2017) 
67:4 U. Toronto L.J. 535 at 453.  
17 As far as this article refers to wider controversies about indigeneity, it opts for an implicitly constructivist account. 
See for examples Rogers Brubaker, ‘Ethnicity without Groups’ (2002) 43:2 European Journal of Sociology 163, 186; 
and Gabrielle Lynch, I Say to You. Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011) 6. 




This article argues, first, that, in associating indigenous rights with given social groups, 
the theory of legal pluralism struggles to produce a comprehensive understanding of 
the subjects that claim indigenous rights, and of the grounds on which such rights can 
be established. This is in fact reflected in primary international instruments regarding 
indigenous rights, which, influenced by the theoretical concepts of legal pluralism, 
inform national legal norms. Tellingly, the main instrument of international law 
addressing indigenous peoples, Convention 169 of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO 169), attempts to circumvent precise definition of the subjects 
entitled to indigenous rights. It states in Art 1(2) that: ‘Self-identification as indigenous 
or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to 
which the provisions of this Convention apply’.18 Similarly, the African Commission on 
Human Rights has observed that ‘a strict definition of indigenous peoples is neither 
necessary nor desirable’.19 In the UN’s draft criteria for defining indigenous people, the 
‘desirability of developing a definition of indigenous peoples’ is admitted, but its 
feasibility is questioned. This document observes that ‘the concept of ‘indigenous’ 
cannot be defined in precise and inclusive terms, which can be applied in the same 
manner to all regions of the world’. Importantly, it states that indigenous rights have 
been successfully delivered despite the UN ‘not having adopted any formal definition of 
indigenous peoples’.20 
 
In addition, second, this article argues that, although positioned at the sociological end 
of the spectrum of legal analysis, the theory of legal pluralism has not adequately 
identified the social foundations of indigenous law. In this respect, it claims that the 
processes of legal mobilization that occur in the construction of indigenous rights do not 
articulate patterns of citizenship, in which already existent, socially localized identities 
are solidified against nationally dominant normative orders.  Albeit often imperceptibly, 
legal mobilization for indigenous rights detaches experiences of citizenship from 
particular social memberships, and it both presupposes and reinforces a highly 
                                                          
18 International Labour Organization Convention no 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 
June 1989, 28 ILM 1382 (1989) [ILO 169]. 
19 International Labour Organization and African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Overview Report of the 
Research Project by the International Labour Organization and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Constitutional and Legislative Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 24 African Countries (Geneva: ILO Publications, 
2009) 15 [Overview Report].  
20 Note by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of Working Troup on Indigenous Populations on criteria which might be applied when 
considering the concept of indigenous peoples. U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1995/3 (June 21, 1995) paras 3, 6, 9, 65. 




generalized system of norms. Consequently, indigenous rights do not stand against, but 
instead they in fact form part of, a process of legal nationalization, in which the central 
legal/political order of society is extended and reinforced. Indeed, litigation over such 
rights often assumes particular nation-building significance in social environments, in 
which more classical instruments of legal and political inclusion – for example, national 
political parties and collective political organizations – have not been able to galvanize 
sectoral actors in national society around the political system.21 In this respect, the 
assertion of indigenous rights can be seen as a process that intensifies the power of 
formal state institutions, and connects these institutions more deeply to actors in 
different parts of national society. 22    
 
In parallel, third, this article argues that the establishment of indigenous rights reflects a 
process in which new rights are created within the legal system, as the institutions in 
national legal system interact with, and extract norms from, the global legal system. 
These rights are not simply attributable to pre-existing social subjects. The recognition 
of such rights means that the legal subjectivity of indigenous rights claimants is 
profoundly transfigured, and, through their acquisition of rights, rights-holding 
communities are stripped away from the factual societal sub-national collectives to 
which they are attached, and integrated in a higher-order, increasingly global legal 
system. In fact, the imputation of rights to indigenous communities dismantles 
traditional collectivities in society, and it generates new legal collectives, which are 
materialized through global law, extending deeply into national society. Of course, 
collective actors in society may expressly comprehend themselves as actors with 
ethnically founded entitlements, prior to the law. Yet, such entitlements typically 
become legally real through a process of correlation with global law, and they cannot 
easily be isolated from more patterns of global norm production. In consequence, the 
sociological key to the consolidation of indigenous rights lies not in observing 
indigenous rights as material substances, but in observing the construction of such 
                                                          
21 For more typical examples of this process see Daniele Caramani, The Nationalization of Politics. The Formation of 
National Electorates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
22 There are many institutional processes that demonstrate how the formal treatment of indigenous questions leads 
to the institutional extension and solidification of national legal/political systems. In Brazil, the FUNAI, created in 
1967, is the principal political agency for indigenous issues and the Public Prosecutor’s Officer is the legal 
representative of indigenous people. Chile has seen the creation of a Ministry of Indigenous Issues. This tendency 
has culminated in the establishment of new state organs for indigenous questions in post-2009 Bolivia.  




rights as a distinctive social process, in which the national legal system develops new 
instruments to promote the inclusion of social actors that surround it.23 In this 
perspective, the attribution of rights to plural social groups is always a process of legal 
generalization, in which claimants to rights assume a position in an expanding legal 
community, which is both national and global. As a result, the legal rights accorded to 
indigenous communities are generated by acts of recognition that are not determined 
by the social position or inherent practices of these communities, and they are secured 
through relatively autonomous, increasingly global modes of legal production and 
inclusion.  Beneath the process of indigenous rights formation, we can identify a 
sociological phenomenon of great significance– that is, namely, that otherwise 
challenged trajectories of national legal construction often rely on transnational legal 
categories for their realization. 
 
In consequence, the paradigm required for interpreting rights is not persuasively 
derived either from classical legal pluralism or from legal mobilization theory. A 
paradigm for observing the construction of indigenous rights can be based in part on 
global citizenship theories, which are already established in other areas of legal 
analysis.24 From this perspective, acts of litigation for indigenous rights can be viewed 
as acts that incorporate global norms into national law, or that instil an idea of global 
citizenship in national citizenship practices. In so doing, these acts also widen the 
societal reach of national law and national institutions, so that, for reasons addressed 
below, global law forms a precondition for the social extension of national law.25 
However, a paradigm for observing the construction of indigenous rights might also use 
elements of Luhmann’s theory of the legal system. In particular, it might examine the 
formation of indigenous rights as a process which reflects the increasing autonomy of 
                                                          
23 This insight is adapted from Niklas Luhmann, who argues that the modern legal system institutionalizes 
‘coordinated learning processes’ to adapt to its environment. See Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1980) 261. 
24 For analysis of this process in other contexts see Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal & Suzanne Shanahan, 
‘The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 
1990’ (1997) 62(5) American Sociological Review 735 at 743; Francisco O. Ramirez & John W. Meyer, ‘Toward 
Post-National Societies and Global Citizenship’ (2012) 4(1) Multicultural Education Review 1 at 21.  
25 This second element of the theory is less well established in global citizenship theory. However, this is implied in 
John W. Meyer, ‘The World-Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State’ in Albert Bergesen, ed, Studies of the Modern 
World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1980) 121. For a parallel attempt to use world citizenship theory to 
explain indigenous law, arriving at different conclusions, see Erik W. Larson & Roland Aminzade, ‘Nation-States 
Confront the Global: Discourses of Indigenous Rights in Fiji and Tanzania’ (2007) 48 The Sociological Quarterly 
801.  




national legal systems, in which the allocation of rights to indigenous groups enables the 
national legal order to promote more even patterns of inclusion, generating rights that 
can be accessed by, and thus help to integrate, all collective actors.26 From this 
perspective, the increasing inclusivity of national law is linked to the fact that the 
national legal system is locked into an emerging global legal system, and the 
transmission of rights from the global to the national legal domain acts to intensify the 
inner-societal penetration of national legal institutions and national legal norms.27 Seen 
in this perspective, indigenous rights emerge as articulations of a process of legal 
differentiation, linked to the increasingly deep interlinkage between national and global 
law.   
 
On this foundation, this article argues that the subject of indigenous rights can be most 
accurately understood if it is seen as a phenomenon that is not constructed through 
material attributes. Of course, some element of anthropological essentialism always 
survives in law relating to indigeneity, and legal constructions of indigenous rights are 
never fully devoid of anthropological dimensions. In Brazil, for example, communities 
can only acquire indigenous status and specific indigenous rights through certification 
by an external specialist.28 Legislation in Chile rules that indigenous communities are 
characterized by certain ethnic distinctions.29 In some Colombian cases, anthropologists 
have appeared before the Constitutional Court to explain the needs of indigenous 
communities in order to determine the extent of their rights.30 More generally, however, 
this article shows that indigenous rights are formed outside anthropological structures, 
and the basic substance of these rights is not extracted from social or anthropological 
facts. Within the legal system, indigenous rights are generated through certain types of 
legal case, in which indigenous communities are characteristically involved. Moreover, 
these rights, generally, do not have an absolutely sui generis character, they are claimed 
and justified on preconditions shared with other subjects, and, above all, they are often 
                                                          
26 For Luhmann’s theory of rights as sources of social inclusion see Niklas Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution. Ein 
Beitrag zur politischen Soziologie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965) 221. 
27 On the inevitable nexus between law’s inclusionary functions and the emergence of a global legal system see 
Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993) 571.  
28 See Law No. 6001, The Indian Statute (19/11/1973). 
29 See Art 2(c) of Law No 19.253 (1993).     
30 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decisions T-113/09; T-129/11. In Colombia, a special agency located in the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Office for Indigenous, Roma and Minorities Affairs, is responsible for carrying out 
ethnographic studies to classify indigenous communities. 




quite separate from, or only contingently related to, the subjects that claim them.31 
Typically, these rights cannot be detached from global patterns of legal evolution, and, 
as much as they reflect any extra-legal substance, they articulate globally generalized 
processes of transformation, adaption and inclusion that shape the legal system at the 
global level. Often, in fact, rights accorded to indigenous peoples actually create the legal 
subjectivity of these peoples. Outside the law, further, the basic subjects that lay claim to 
indigenous rights often only come into being on the foundation of global legal norms.32 
Both in their legal and their social construction, indigenous subjects cannot be simply or 
immediately attached to a material social reality. 
 
In order to comprehend the growing importance of indigenous rights, in sum, some 
conceptual reorientation is required. Prominent analyses of the claims of indigenous 
populations have argued that indigenous legal orders are cemented by their opposition 
to the autonomous functions of the legal system.33 However, the growing recognition of 
indigeneity is a manifestation of relatively autonomous patterns of global legal 
evolution, and, more strictly, of the rise of a relatively autonomous global legal system. 
None of this implies that growing recognition of indigenous rights does not create room 
for variable legal orders within national societies. Yet, it implies that the rise of localized 
legal pluralism is determined, specifically, by the increasingly global self-reproduction 
of the legal system in its national and its transnational dimensions. At the core of the 
rising recognition of indigenous rights is a process in which national and global law 
form relatively autonomous connections, and – paradoxically – this transnational influx 
                                                          
31 Even in constitutions that accord extensive rights to indigenous peoples, these peoples are often placed alongside 
other marginalized and vulnerable subjects. In Art 32 of the Bolivian Constitution, African-Bolivian people enjoy all 
the economic, social, political and cultural rights that are recognized for rural native indigenous peoples. The 
Brazilian Constitution (Art 251(1)) states that: ‘The National Government shall protect expressions of popular, 
indigenous and Afro-Brazilian cultures and those of other participant groups in the process of national civilization.’ 
In Colombia, the Office for Indigenous, Roma and Minorities Affairs also addresses questions concerning Roma 
people and LGBT individuals. A different office in the Ministry of Interior is responsible for issues concerning 
Negro, Creole, and African-Colombian communities. Other commentators have also questioned whether 
indigenous rights have a fully sui-generis quality. See for instance Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under 
International Law. From Victims to Actors (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2006) 121 [Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights]; Ben Saul, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights. International and Regional Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 3, 39, 
133, 159 [Saul, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights]; Manuela Zips-Mairitsch, Lost Lands? (Land) Rights of the San in 
Botswana and the Legal Concept of Indigeneity in Africa (Münster: Lit, 2013) 94 [Zips-Mairitsch, Lost Lands?]. 
32 See for examples infra pp. XXX.  
33 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Cuando los excluidos tienen derecho: justicia indígena, plurinacionalidad e 
interculturalidad’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos & José Luis Exení Rodríguez, eds, Justicia indígena, plurinacionalidad e 
interculturalidad en Bolivia (Quito: Abya-Yala, 2012) 19. 




underpins more uniform processes of national legal inclusion and more robustly 
integrative patterns of citizenship within national societies.  
 
2. Three levels of construction 
This article seeks to comprehend the emergence and position of indigenous rights by 
building up a profile of these rights as they are established at different levels of the 
global legal order. To this end, it examines the construction of indigenous rights in three 
separate domains of the global legal system, that is: 1. in global international human 
rights law; 2. in regional international human rights law; 3. in municipal human rights 
law. In particular, it focuses on the formation of indigenous rights on the different 
planes of the global legal system insofar as these rights relate to indigenous peoples or 
population groups in Latin America and Africa. These regions are selected for 
comparative analysis because, in both regions, political contests concerning indigenous 
rights have recently assumed pressing legal and political relevance, and existing legal 
instruments have been refined to accommodate a pluralistic legal landscape, in which 
legal claims of indigenous subjects are salient.34 Moreover, both these regions have 
evolved comprehensive legal structures concerned with indigeneity: that is, they 
possess judicial orders focused on indigenous rights in each domain of global law – in 
global international law (the United Nations (UN) Human Rights System), in regional 
international law (the Inter-American and African Human Rights Systems), and in 
domestic law (national constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions).35 Of these regions, 
Latin America has consolidated a far more extensive corpus of law addressing 
indigenous rights. However, both regions have acquired a legal apparatus for 
constructing such rights on each plane of global law. Both regions are, therefore, 
plausible objects for comparison. Within Latin America and Africa, we aim at broad 
coverage of all states with extensive legislation and case law relating to indigenous 
rights, although, at the domestic level, particular emphasis is placed on those national 
legal systems whose populations are marked by a greater degree of ethnic diversity. By 
adopting this comprehensive approach, this article aims to explain how indigenous 
                                                          
34 Mauro Barelli, ‘The Interplay between Global and Regional Human Rights Systems in the Construction of the 
Indigenous Rights Regime’ (2010) 32:4 Human Rights Quarterly 951 at 967 [Barelli, ‘The Interplay’].  
35 Other regions with large indigenous populations have not accepted the jurisdiction of courts with supranational 
jurisdiction. In polities such as Australia, Canada, and the United States indigenous rights have acquired increased 
importance, but they are not articulated at a regional level.  




rights are constructed within the global legal system as a whole, how the legal 
subjectivity of indigenous rights holders is formed through global law, and how global 
law shapes legal practices in national societies.   
 
3. Global international human rights law  
Historically, the ILO was a pioneer in promoting international standards to address the 
claims of indigenous and tribal peoples. In 1957, the ILO adopted Convention 107, 
which concerned the protection of indigenous and other tribal or semi-tribal 
populations in independent countries. ILO 107 received twenty-seven ratifications, and 
it formed the first endeavour to codify indigenous rights at the level of international 
law. It attracted severe criticisms for its allegedly paternalist and integrationist tone. 
However, ILO 107 remained for years the only hard-law international document 
relating to indigenous and tribal peoples, and it drew attention internationally to the 
position of indigenous peoples.36 Subsequently, in the sphere of global international 
jurisprudence, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in Western 
Sahara (1975) marked a watershed moment in the recognition of indigenous and tribal 
peoples. This opinion declared the concept of res nullius inapplicable in territories 
inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organization.37  
 
In 1989, the adoption of ILO 169 reflected a vital change in attitude towards indigenous 
populations in international law, and it promoted a doctrine, not of assimilationism, but 
of solidarity, as the premise for their legal recognition.38 ILO 169 entered into force in 
1991, giving formal international protection to a number of collective rights for 
indigenous peoples. These rights included rights to cultural integrity, to consultation 
and participation in relevant decision-making processes, to certain forms of self-
government, to land occupancy, to territory and resources, and to non-discrimination in 
the social and economic spheres.39 Despite the fact that only twenty-two states, most of 
                                                          
36 See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People), Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
including the Right to Development. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008) [Anaya, Promotion and Protection]. 
37 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. Reports 12 at paras 75-83. See also Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous 
Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002) 82. 
38 Federico Lenzerini, ‘Reparations for Indigenous People in International and Comparative Law: An Introduction’ 
in Federico Lenzerini, ed, Reparations for Indigenous People: International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 19 [Lenzerini, Reparations for Indigenous People’]. 
39 On the significance of such categories of collective rights see Allen Buchanan, ‘The Role of Collective Rights in 
the Theory of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ (1993) 3 Transn. Law & Contemp. Politics 89 at 91.   




them in Latin America, have actually ratified ILO 169, the norms embodied in the 
Convention have been elaborated by other bodies and courts,40 and it has achieved 
wide-ranging impact beyond the states that have ratified it. In addition, in 2007, the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was formally adopted by 143 Member 
States of the UN.41 Although only accorded the status of soft law, the Declaration 
strongly affirms the rights to self-determination of indigenous peoples. Other 
international standard-setting instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, and some UNESCO instruments, also provide for the protection of 
indigenous peoples.42 
 
Amongst these agreements, ILO 169 is the most important instrument for protecting 
indigenous peoples, and it clearly establishes a foundation for the construction of 
indigenous persons as subjects of international law.43 As mentioned, this Convention 
does not provide a generalizable definition of indigenous peoples. Instead, it provides a 
statement of coverage, enumerating groups protected by its provisions. On this basis, the 
Convention is applicable to the following groups: a) tribal peoples in independent 
countries, whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other 
sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially 
either by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; b) peoples in 
independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from 
the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the 
country belongs, at the time of conquest, of colonization, or of the establishment of 
present state boundaries, and who retain some or all of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political institutions. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal is declared 
the ‘fundamental criterion’ for determining the groups to which the provisions of the 
Convention apply (Art 1(2)).  
 
                                                          
40 See Lenzerini, ‘Reparations for Indigenous People’, supra note 38, at 19.  
41 The General Assembly Resolution 61/295, concerning the Declaration, was adopted a year after its draft 
submission by the United Nations Human Rights Council. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st session, U.N. Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007). 
42 See Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in 
International and Comparative Law’ (2002) 34 N. Y. Univ. J. Int. Law Politics 189 at 228.  
43 See Russel Lawrence Barsh, ‘Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law’ 
(1994) 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 33 at 66.  




In consequence, international bodies pertaining to the UN system have not adopted a 
final definition of indigeneity or of the characteristics of subjects able to claim 
indigenous rights.44 For practical purposes, the commonly accepted understanding of 
indigeneity is that provided by Martínez Cobo, UN Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in his Study 
on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. This study states that:  
 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other 
sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of 
them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are 
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural 
patterns, social institutions and legal system.45  
 
In these respects, global international law proposes a hybrid definition of indigenous 
communities. Some elements of this definition appear, at first glance, to be predicated 
on objectively manifest characteristics. However, the substantial aspects of this 
definition are tempered by the fact that the actual possession of such characteristics is 
defined in non-essentialist fashion, as the result of self-identification.46 Moreover, the 
long-standing classification of indigeneity as an attribute of ‘non-dominant’ groups 
creates a definition that is difficult to apply to some countries with multiple ethnic 
populations, in which certain indigenous groups clearly have a dominant socio-political 
position. If taken literally, this classification would preclude many indigenous groups in 
Africa, in particular, from claiming indigeneity. In addition, some rights granted to 
indigenous communities at a global level are increasingly extended to other 
                                                          
44 UN Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, The Concept of Indigenous Peoples (Background Paper 
to Workshop on Data Collection and Disaggregation for Indigenous Peoples, New York, United States, 19–21 
January 2004). UN Doc PFII/2004/WS.1/3 
45 José Martínez Cobo, Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations: Final report. U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 (1986). Available at: 
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46 See further discussion infra p. XXX. 




communities, with related vulnerabilities. For example, in 2016, the UN Human Rights 
Council presented to the General Assembly a Draft declaration on the rights of peasants 
and other people working in rural areas, based on proposals of the international 
peasants’ movement, which also guarantees the right to land for peasant farmers.47  
 
Questions concerning the human rights of indigenous peoples have been addressed in 
the UN since the 1970s. At first, the UN addressed indigenous rights exclusively through 
its human rights treaty bodies, which monitor the implementation of international 
human rights treaties. More recently, three organs with specific responsibility for 
indigenous issues have been created: the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(established in 2000 by the Economic and Social Council), the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous People (established in 2007 under the authority of Human Rights 
Council), and the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous people, whose mandate 
was established in 2001 under the authority of Human Rights Council. Together, these 
bodies have adapted general human rights law to indigenous contexts. However, they 
have not necessarily created new rights or applied rights that are restricted to 
indigenous people. Decisions of the Human Rights Committee have addressed questions 
related indigenous peoples concerning discrimination,48 the right to be consulted,49 the 
trafficking of vulnerable groups,50 health and education,51 political participation,52 
children’s rights,53 and gender rights.54 Yet, these decisions do not differentiate strictly 
between indigenous peoples, people of African descent, women, migrants, persons with 
disabilities, population of rural areas, and other minorities. 
                                                          
47 Human Rights Council, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas. U.N. Doc.  
A/HRC/WG.15/3/2 at art. 19 of (March 8, 2016). Available at: https://documents-dds-
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48 See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Peru, CCPR/C/PER/CO/5, 29 April 2013, at para 
7; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Costa Rica, CCPR/C/CRI/CO/6, 22 April 2016, at para 
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50 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Colombia, CCPR/C/COL/CO/7, 17 November 2016.  
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53 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Paraguay, CCPR/C/PRY/CO/2, 24 April 2006, at para 
22. 
54 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Peru, 15/11/2000. CCPR/CO/70/PER, at para 21.  




Overall, global international law does not provide a robust definition of the subjects able 
to claim indigenous rights. As a result, the definition of indigeneity has acquired more 
concrete social meaning at subordinate levels of legal construction.    
 
4. Regional international human rights law  
4.1 Latin America: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
In 1989, a Special Working Group operating in cooperation with the Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples within the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) began to prepare a legal instrument concerning the rights of indigenous 
populations. In 1997, the IACHR approved a draft of an American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 2016, the final version of this document was adopted 
by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. This Declaration is the 
first instrument in the history of the Organization that specifically protects the rights of 
indigenous peoples in the region.55 In this period, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) began to decide contentious cases concerning indigenous rights; it was 
the first international tribunal to do so.56 Between 1991 and 2017, the IACtHR ruled in 
twenty-eight such cases against eleven different States; that is, against half of the 
polities that have, at least temporarily, recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the 
Court.57 In the present decade, the IACtHR has already reached fourteen decisions in 
such cases. Currently, the Court has two additional cases involving indigenous rights at 
the Merits Stage, pending the delivery of the final judgment.58 Taken together, these 
                                                          
55 See more details about the adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at: 
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-075/16. 
56 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR], Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (2001) 
Series C No.79 [Mayagna]. See Laurence Burgogue-Larsen & Amaya Ubeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Case Law and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 [2011]) 501 [Burgogue-Larsen & 
Ubeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights]. 
57 The following States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Argentina, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Perú, Dominican Republic, Suriname and Uruguay. The 
main exceptions are some Caribbean Islands, the USA and Canada, which means that the Inter-American System 
pretty is in essence a Latin American instrument. Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have denounced the 
Convention in 1998 and 2012, respectively. Peru withdrew its recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the 
Court in 1999, but returned to the System in 2001.  
58 In chronological order up to November 2017, the cases decided by the Court are: Aloeboetoe et al (1991), El Amparo 
(1996), Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community (2001), Bámaca Velásquez (2002), Myrna Mack Chang (2003), Plan de 
Sánchez Massacre (2004), Yatama (2005), Yakye Axa Indigenous Community (2005), Moiwana Community (2005), Lopez-
Alvarez (2006), Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community (2006), Saramaka People (2007), Escué-Zapata (2008), Tiu Tojín (2008), 
Chitay Nech et al (2010), Fernández Ortega et al (2010), Rosendo Cantú et al (2010), Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community 
(2010), Santo Domingo Massacre (2012), Río Negro Massacres (2012), Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku (2012), Operation 
Genesis (2013), Norín Catríman (2014), Kuna Indigenous People (2014), Garífuna Community of Punta Piedra (2015), Garífuna 
Community of Triunfo de la Cruz and its members (2015), Kaliña and Lokono (2015), Village Chichupac and Neighbour 




numbers represent roughly fifteen per cent of the total number of rulings handed down 
by the Court. The Court has also adopted broad rules in granting locus standi to 
indigenous population groups.59 The achievements of the IACtHR and the IACHR in this 
area have been clearly recognized in the UN, not lastly for their important normative 
effect in other regions.60   
 
In addressing rights of indigenous population groups, the IACtHR adopts latitude in 
interpreting indigeneity, and it uses a definition based, not on static identity or fixed 
group membership, but on flexibly attributed, interpretively constructed entitlements. 
To be sure, the IACtHR has established certain rights that were ascribed, at least at first, 
exclusively to indigenous peoples, and it has identified certain rights whose exercise is, 
primarily, the province of indigenous peoples. By way of example, the list of such rights 
includes: the right of indigenous communities to be consulted in matters relating to 
their territories; the right to hold communal property; the right to enjoyment of natural 
resources on communal territories; the right to utilize traditionally owned lands; within 
variable constraints, the right to territorial self-determination.61 Most of these rights are 
determined by the specific facts of given cases, and they reflect the circumstances in 
which indigenous groups commonly file suit. For instance, the establishment of these 
rights is shaped by the fact that indigenous groups are often exposed to eviction, 
forcible displacement, and territorial deprivation, often resulting from extractivist or 
developmentalist programmes conducted on their lands. More typically, however, the 
IACtHR employs a broad approach in defining the subjects to whom rights can be 
attributed. In fact, the Court has heard cases involving other minority communities 
exposed to human rights violations, especially government violence, similar to those to 
which indigenous communities are exposed, and it has recognized these communities as 
claimants to rights akin to those ascribed to clearly indigenous communities in 
analogous positions. Some such cases refer to population groups of African descent, 
whose position is not uncontroversially classifiable as pre-colonial. One example is the 
Maroons (Bush Negroes), a tribal group composed by descendants of Africans, who 
                                                          
Communities of Rabinal (2016). The two cases currently at the merit stage are: Maurilia Coc Max et al (Massacre of 
Xamán), and Xucuru People and its members. 
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60 See Anaya, Promotion and Protection, supra note 36 at 32.  
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were taken to the region of Suriname in the seventeenth century to work as slaves on 
plantations.62 A further example is the Honduran Garífunas, a tribal group of persons of 
mixed African and indigenous descent, who trace their origins to the eighteenth 
century.63 In one case, concerning the Moiwana community in Suriname, the Court 
decided that, although ‘the Moiwana community members are not indigenous to the 
region’, the communal rights to property accorded to indigenous groups should also be 
granted to the tribal Moiwana community members. This was justified on grounds that 
the Moiwanas possess a ‘profound and all-encompassing relationship to their ancestral 
lands’.64 
 
In consequence, the primary tendency of the IACtHR is to adopt a non-essentialist 
definition of indigeneity and indigenous rights. The Court imputes such rights to 
subjects, not exclusively on the basis of objectively measured social or cultural 
attributes, but as part of wider patterns of rights attribution. In consequence, the 
concept of indigeneity employed by the IACtHR acquires clearest objective meaning, not 
in any formal or generic sense, but in the particular facts of the cases in which 
indigenous or similar groups appear before the Court. The Court normally encounters 
the claims of indigenous communities in a distinctive set of legal contexts, and the 
construction of indigenous communities and their rights is not easily comprehensible 
outside such factual settings. Seen in this light, indigeneity emerges as a relatively 
contingent foundation for rights. In most cases, rights ascribed to indigenous 
communities are not strictly separable from other primary rights, which are quite 
generally protected for marginalized social groups, whose property and livelihoods are 
precarious. In most cases, the rights accorded by the IACtHR to population groups 
identified as indigenous are extracted from generalized constructions of human rights, 
and the fact that rights are justified through claims to indigeneity does not substantially 
determine their content. 
 
4.1.2 Cases of massacres 
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This relative contingency of indigenous rights is illustrated by cases heard by the 
IACtHR regarding large-scale violence against indigenous groups. Some of the most 
prominent examples of such cases concern the persecution of members of indigenous 
communities in the 1980s.  
 
For instance, in Plan de Sánchez Massacre v Guatemala (2004),65 for instance, the Court 
condemned the massacre of 268 persons by the Guatemalan Army and civil 
collaborators, as well as subsequent acts of intimidation and discrimination against 
survivors and close relatives of the victims. In Río Negro Massacres v Guatemala (2012), 
the Court condemned massacres perpetrated by the Guatemalan army and civil defence 
patrols leading to the destruction of the Mayan community of Río Negro.66 In these 
cases, the Court recognized the distinct standing of applicants as indigenous 
communities. In some cases involving massacres against indigenous communities, 
moreover, the IACtHR has imposed reparatory measures that take into account the 
cultural particularity of these communities. In Plan de Sánchez, it was ruled that, by way 
of reparation, there should be a public act to acknowledge the responsibility of the State 
for the violation of indigenous rights, and that this should be conducted both in Spanish 
and Maya-Achí. In addition, the Court ruled that the State should take steps to improve 
the infrastructure in communities affected by the massacres, and to create a program to 
promote the study of Maya-Achí culture.67  
 
Despite this, however, remedies provided for indigenous communities in such cases do 
not vary substantially from those provided in cases of massacres involving non-
indigenous groups. For example, remedies in these cases included compensation, 
rehabilitation (including medical and psychological treatment), the effective location of 
the victims had been forcibly disappeared, the creation of training courses on human 
rights for public agents, implementation of development programs and creation of 
infrastructure for the affected communities. Tellingly, these remedies have also been 
                                                          
65 See IACtHR, Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala (2004) Series C No. 105 at para 2 [Plan de Sánchez]. 
66 See IACtHR, Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala (2012) Series C No. 250.  
67 See Plan de Sánchez at note 65 paras 2, 4, 5, 9. 




enforced in cases concerning massacres of which non-indigenous communities were the 
victims.68  
 
4.1.3 Land rights 
Due to economic pressures, indigenous and tribal communities in Latin America have 
been evicted from and deprived of their traditional lands, a condition which often 
results in lack of housing, and reduced access to health facilities. In some instances, for 
example, States have granted plots of traditional indigenous territory to private parties 
involved in projects such as the construction of highways and dams, insisting that 
economic and national-developmentalist interests prevail over the right of indigenous 
and tribal peoples to occupy their ancestral lands.69 Occasionally, the fact that 
indigenous groups are removed from traditional lands threatens their survival and 
integrity.  
 
For these reasons, many cases brought before the IACtHR relating to indigenous rights 
concern land claims, and the position of indigenous communities is widely addressed in 
judgements concerning land rights. Central to many such cases is the fact that some 
defendant States do not accord a distinct juridical personality to indigenous peoples, 
and, owing to the customary foundations of the system of land tenure used by some 
indigenous populations, governments do not always recognize them as holding 
justiciable property rights to ancestral territories and natural resources. For this reason, 
cases concerning land claims often basic raise questions regarding the applicability of 
customary law, the legal personality of indigenous communities, and – as a result – the 
right to remedy of indigenous populations.  
 
The first case in which the IACtHR addressed questions of indigenous land rights was 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (2001).70 In hearing this case, the 
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Court declared that the State should adopt all measures necessary to create an effective 
mechanism for marking out and providing titles for the property of indigenous 
communities, in accordance with their customary law and values. In addition, the Court 
determined, generally, that a State has the duty to facilitate free, prior and informal 
consultation with indigenous and tribal peoples about the use of their traditional lands. 
This right of consultation implies that indigenous communities are entitled to receive 
information regarding the likely social and environmental impact of any resource 
exploitation within their territories, and it presupposes the absence of coercion, 
intimidation or manipulation during the consultation process.71 Subsequently, in a case 
against Ecuador, Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (2012), the Court 
condemned the State because, in the 1990s, it had granted a permit to a private 
company to carry out oil exploration and extractive activities in the territory of the 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku without having previously consulted with them 
or obtained their consent.72  
 
In developing this case law, the IACtHR has produced a unique line of jurisprudence 
regarding land rights for indigenous communities. In Awas Tingni,73 the Court became 
the first international tribunal to recognize the right of an indigenous community to its 
communal property, regardless of whether it held a formal legal title. Then, in two cases 
against Suriname, Saramaka People v Suriname (2007) and the recent Kaliña and 
Lokono Peoples v Suriname (2015), the Court ruled that States have an obligation to 
show recognition of the legal personality of indigenous peoples, and such recognition 
entails recognition of their collective right to property and their right to an effective 
remedy in cases where this right is violated.74 Most significantly, the Court has argued 
that ancestral lands constitute a fundamental precondition for essential aspects of the 
cultural and spiritual existence of some indigenous groups. As a result, the Court has 
established a right to property that extends beyond the formal-individualist right to 
private dominion over goods, indicating that indigenous peoples have a distinctive right 
to communal property because ownership of land with cultural significance to the life of 
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the community has implications that exceed considerations of mere personal use or 
profit.75 In so doing, the Court has stressed its willingness to adopt an ‘evolutionary 
interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human rights’, and so 
to generate normative constructions for the expansion of more classical property 
rights.76  
 
Some points are of particular note in such cases. First, in these cases, the IACtHR has 
established certain categories of rights that are typically attributed to indigenous 
peoples, and it has insisted that States have particular obligations towards such peoples, 
granting, de facto, a distinct legal personality defined by indigeneity. This applies in 
particular in the sphere of land and property rights. Second, many rights commonly 
granted to indigenous peoples entail an extension or an amplification of classical rights, 
more commonly guaranteed under national and international law. This is usually 
guaranteed by a jurisprudential technique aimed at widening existing rights.77 As 
discussed, land and property rights accorded distinctively to indigenous groups are 
established through an expansion of rights to private property. They are also 
determined through the expansion of the right to an effective remedy, which is posited 
as the basis for the legal personality of indigenous groups. In some cases, indigenous 
rights have been established through the intensified protection of general rights to 
equality in international law.78 However, these rights do not constitute entirely new, or 
fully distinct rights. On one hand, although it supports the idea of a ‘distinctive 
relationship’ between indigenous peoples and their lands, the IACtHR has already 
affirmed that their property rights are not absolute.79 Moreover, in recent cases, the 
IACtHR has addressed land claims of communities of groups other than indigenous 
people. Examples are (Operation Genesis) v Colombia (2013), Kuna Indigenous People of 
Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano and their Members v Panama 
(2014) and Garífuna Punta Piedra Community and its Members v Honduras (2015). In 
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these cases, the Court extended the right to traditional lands accepted for indigenous 
communities to other groups, including communities of African origin. As a result, the 
Court has indicated that the establishment of juridical personality based in indigeneity 
is fluid, and rights flowing from indigeneity can be broadened to include other groups 
for which communally held property is culturally significant.  
 
4.1.4 The right to vida digna 
Alongside more possessive constructions of land rights, the IACtHR has advanced a 
more ethically generalized foundation for the defence of indigenous and tribal rights to 
land. Justification for indigenous rights has been intensified through the notion that 
land rights are linked to the right to life, and especially the right to ‘vida digna’: life with 
dignity.80  
 
Originating in the Latin American context in Colombian public law, vida digna is one of 
the most important concepts elaborated by the IACtHR. This concept has been 
constructed through a comprehensive judicial interpretation of the right to life, 
enshrined in Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the 
Court has expanded this right to establish a series of secondary fundamental rights. In 
essence, this concept indicates that the right to life is not exhaustively defined as the 
simple negative right not to be deprived of life. On the contrary, the right to life 
contains, by inference or by necessary extension, a cluster of positive rights, including 
the right to gain access to the conditions (broadly defined) that guarantee a dignified 
existence.81 This concept first appeared in the IACtHR in decisions such as Villagran 
Morales (Street Children) v Guatemala (1999) and Instituto de Reeducación del Menor v 
Paraguay (2004), which addressed legal claims of acutely marginalized social groups. 
However, it is now commonly applied in cases involving indigenous people. In such 
cases, this concept is used to indicate that indigenous persons have a right to own, or at 
least not to be involuntarily removed from, their ancestral lands because of the fact that 
these lands are culturally fundamental to their well-being and to their ability to live 
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their lives in dignified fashion.82 As a result, rights of access to, and use of, particular 
lands are established through a transformative reading of the right to life, which is 
broadened into a right to live in a dignified fashion.  
 
In this respect, the IACtHR has established material rights that have a particular bearing 
on the legal claims of indigenous groups, and which provide legal grounds that 
specifically favour indigenous claims. However, as in other cases, these rights do not 
exclusively belong to indigenous persons. Importantly, the right to dignified life does 
not originate in cases concerning indigenous groups. Moreover, these rights are not 
qualitatively free-standing. On the contrary, as in other cases, they are extracted from 
other primary rights, and they are only contextually applied to indigenous groups. Most 
significantly, in fact, the concept of vida digna has been devised in order to ensure that 
distinct rights for indigenous peoples can be substantiated, not on grounds of static 
ethnic or territorial belonging, but by imagining indigenous communities, like other 
communities, as holistic holders of rights.  
 
In the IACtHR, in sum, there has been extensive engagement with indigenous rights. As 
discussed below, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR had deep impact on the construction 
of indigenous rights in different parts of the globe.83 However, even in the case law of 
the IACtHR, such rights are only marginally founded in indigeneity. They originate in a 
wider system of global rights. 
 
4.2 Africa: The African Commission and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
In general, the recognition of indigeneity as the basis for legal personality and for 
distinctive sets of rights in African regional international judicial bodies has been more 
circumspect than in Latin America. The African regional human rights instrument, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, expressly provides for collective rights, 
and it gives strong protection to cultural rights, which might be seen to incorporate 
indigenous rights.84 Despite this, however, the Charter possesses a state-centric 
                                                          
82 The concept of vida digna is associated with the indigenous right to property in three IACtHR cases involving 
Paraguay. See Yakye Axa, supra note 79 at para 161; Sawhoyamaxa, supra note 59 at para 214-217; and Xákmok Kásek 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (2010) Series C No 214. For comment see Thomas Antkowiak ‘Rights, Resources, 
and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court’ (2014) 35:1 Univ. Pa. J. Int. Law 113. 
83 See infra p. XXX 
84 Saul, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, supra note 31 at 204.  




emphasis,85 and regional recognition of rights attached to indigeneity remains 
cautious.86  
 
There are many obvious societal reasons for the reluctance of the African Charter to 
isolate indigenous affiliation as a source of distinctive legal status. First, not 
unreasonably, it is often taken as orthodoxy that all African peoples are indigenous to 
Africa.87 Moreover, there remains deep anxiety in Africa that the reference to 
indigeneity to support distinctive claims to legal or political rights might induce or 
exacerbate conflicts between different communities.88 Tellingly, in a draft Aide Memoire 
of the African Group in the UN regarding the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, it was observed that the question of indigenous rights should be approached 
with caution because many African states were ‘still recovering from the effects of 
ethnic based conflicts’.89 In addition, the concept of indigeneity is often rejected in 
Africa because it is seen as raising the spectre that distinct population groups might 
seek secession from existing nation-states, causing further depletion of already weak 
state institutions. In the longer period of decolonization, African states routinely 
adopted very defensive conceptions of state sovereignty, and both single governments 
and inter-state agreements refused to acknowledge claims to autonomy or partial 
autonomy by ethnically distinct populations.90 Indicatively, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) refused to recognize claims to indigenous self-determination because of 
the potential challenges to the territorial integrity of national states that might result 
from this.91 In its Advisory Opinion regarding the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights, 
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the African Commission itself struck a cautious note concerning implementation of 
international norms, stating that it supported ‘the protection of the rights of Indigenous 
Populations within the context of a strict respect for the inviolability of borders and of 
the obligation to preserve the territorial integrity of State Parties’.92 On these grounds, 
essentialist use of the concept of indigeneity can easily appear as an obstacle to 
recognition of indigenous rights in Africa.93  
 
In recent years, nonetheless, the balance of opinion in Africa has become more 
accommodating towards concepts of indigeneity, and the African Commission has 
begun to establish a distinct body of reasoning regarding indigenous rights.94 Amongst 
other sources, this is reflected in a Report produced by a Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa, established by the African 
Commission.95 In this Report, the Working Group proposed an account of indigenous 
rights, which was designed to adapt the concept to political realities in Africa, limiting 
the threat of secession and social fragmentation. This Report stated that the quality of 
indigeneity can be assumed by groups claiming ‘a special attachment to and use of their 
traditional land’, such that ‘ancestral land and territory has a fundamental importance 
for their collective physical and cultural survival as peoples’. It also stated that legal 
provisions concerning indigenous persons should be designed to protect 
‘disadvantaged, marginalized and excluded groups’.96 
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In addition, the concept of indigeneity has been cautiously recognized in judicial rulings 
of the African Commission.97 The first such case was Katangese Peoples' Congress v Zaire 
(1995), although in this case the Commission did not decide in favour of the community 
in question.98 Favourable recognition of specific group rights was obtained by 
indigenous communities in later cases brought to the Commission, notably Social and 
Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) 
v Nigeria (2001) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v 
Kenya (2009).  
 
In the first of these cases, indicatively, which concerned attacks by employees of oil 
companies in Nigeria on members of the Ongoni people, the word ‘indigenous’ was not 
expressly used. However, the Commission stipulated that in future ‘communities likely 
to be affected by oil operations’ should receive ‘information on health and 
environmental risks and meaningful access to regulatory and decision-making bodies’, 
and companies should create ‘meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and 
to participate in the development of decisions’.99 This effectively established a right to 
consultation for distinctive and separately defined communities in matters affecting 
their vital interests. In the second case, which concerned ‘violations resulting from the 
displacement of the Endorois community’ in Kenya, the Endorois people were clearly 
identified as an indigenous community.100 Eventually, the Commission decided that the 
respondent State (Kenya) had to recognise that the Endorois possess rights of collective 
ownership. To a limited degree, this ruling entailed a relativization of formal property 
rights in favour of communal property. As a result, the respondent State was informed 
of its ‘duty to evaluate’ whether a restriction of private property rights ‘is necessary to 
preserve the survival of the Endorois community’.101 Importantly, remedies in this case 
were justified primarily by the fact that the Endorois were deemed, through their 
resettlement, to have been deprived of access to water.102  
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This line of jurisprudence has recently been reinforced in the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, in a case regarding the forcible eviction of the Ogiek forest dwellers 
by the Kenyan government.103 This is the first and (to date) only time the African Court 
has ruled on an indigenous rights’ case. In this case, the Court made provisional orders 
in 2013, to the effect that Ogiek land rights should be protected. In the final ruling, the 
Court noted ‘that the concept of indigenous population is not defined in the Charter’, 
and that ‘there is no universally accepted definition of “indigenous population” in other 
international human rights instruments’.104 However, the Court recognized that the 
Ogieks had legitimate claim to indigeneity, and that certain rights flow from indigeneity. 
The Court established the indigeneity of the Ogieks on grounds of their strong 
attachment to their traditional land, and of their cultural distinctiveness.105 However, 
specific rights were granted to the Ogieks primarily through the extension of rights to 
property, life and religious freedom.106 Importantly, the Court based these rights in part 
on the right-to-life jurisprudence of the IACtHR, following Latin American reasoning in 
constructing indigenous rights largely on the foundation of other more generalized 
rights.107    
 
These cases provide clear evidence of growing protection for indigenous rights in Africa. 
Yet, for all their importance in proposing an expansive construction of the right to 
property and of the right to life,108 cases heard in the African human rights system do 
not establish indigenous rights beyond the lines of reasoning pursued in the IACtHR. In 
leading cases, the land rights granted to indigenous groups have been primarily 
extracted from other rights, especially rights to religious freedom and resources, which, 
under increasingly solid international norms, can be claimed by all persons. In some 
rulings, certain privileges have been cautiously ascribed to indigenous groups, on the 
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basis of their distinctively socially marginalized position.109 In such instances, 
nonetheless, care has been taken not to utilize a construction of indigenous entitlements 
that attaches superior rights to indigenous groups. As mentioned, the reasoning of the 
African Commission is underpinned by the principle that it only acknowledges 
indigeneity in the ‘analytical form of the concept’ which can be used by ‘marginalized 
groups’ in order ‘to draw attention to and alleviate the particular form of discrimination 
they suffer from’.110 
 
5. Municipal Human Rights Law  
5.1 Municipal Human Rights Law in Latin American States 
5.1.1 Constitutional and Statutory Law  
At the level of constitutional law, many Latin American states make a range of 
protective provisions for the rights of indigenous communities. These rights are usually 
less formalized in states, such as Chile, Argentina and Brazil, which have not obtained 
new constitutions since 1989, when ILO 169 was adopted. However, these rights are 
given high formal standing in Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia, where new constitutions 
have been adopted since 1989, and in Mexico, where extensive constitutional reform 
was conducted in 2011. For example, Article 246 of the Colombian Constitution (1991) 
permits authorities of indigenous peoples to exercise some jurisdictional functions 
within their territories in accordance with their own laws and procedures. Article 257 
of the Constitution of Ecuador (2008) provides for the formation of indigenous or Afro-
Ecuadorian territorial districts. Article 30 of the Bolivian Constitution (2009) protects 
cultural rights and rights of consultation for indigenous peoples. Articles 289-296 
provide for certain powers of indigenous self-government, and they establish a 
framework in which indigenous communities can acquire formal autonomy (as 
autonomías). Article 192(3) declares that the state will reinforce indigenous justice. 
Indeed, the constitution adopts as a basic norm that indigenous courts form an equally 
ranked part of the legal system as a whole. 
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Generally, the constitutional protection of indigenous rights in Latin America is not easy 
to separate from international legal norms, and such protection cannot be seen as the 
outcome of purely domestic arrangements. For example, the Colombian constitution of 
1991 was created by a constituent assembly, in which, amongst a range of parties 
engaged in the long-standing civil conflict in Colombia, indigenous groups were 
represented.  However, debates in the assembly were partly pre-configured by 
international human rights norms, which had penetrated deep into Colombian society in 
the 1980s, as international organizations had become more involved in the Colombian 
conflict.111 The drafting of the Constitution also coincided with Colombia’s ratification of 
ILO 169, and provisions of ILO 169 appear directly in Article 246 of the Constitution. 
Indigenous groups were also extensively involved in the writing of the Bolivian 
Constitution of 2009, and the constitution-making process in Bolivia was partly driven 
by indigenous mobilization. In this context, however, ILO 169, which had been drafted 
under Bolivian supervision and rapidly incorporated in Bolivian law, acquired the status 
of a pre-constitutional principle,112 providing a prior guarantee for recognition of 
indigenous rights during the constitution-making process.113 In each example, 
indigenous groups were able to claim rights because of the openings and opportunities 
provided by international law. 
 
5.1.2 Jurisprudence of Superior Courts  
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The key patterns of recognition for indigenous rights in Latin America are visible, not in 
constitutional provisions, but in the jurisprudence of superior courts, giving effect to 
general provisions concerning indigenous groups. In this regard, most case law in Latin 
America follows the tendencies discussed above, and it falls short of granting fully sui-
generis rights to indigenous groups. In fact, most rights ascribed to groups claiming 
rights founded in indigeneity amplify the substance of already existing rights, albeit 
often using affiliation to an ethnic or sub-national group as grounds for the 
expansionary construction of such rights. 
 
5.1.2.1 Land rights  
As at the regional international level, indigenous rights acquire extensive domestic 
coverage in Latin America in the area of land law. Recognition of land rights for 
indigenous groups appears in a broad spectrum of case law, and it ranges from  
relatively restrictive to relatively expansive rulings.  
 
At the relatively restrictive end of the spectrum, the Brazilian Supreme Court has 
recognized claims to land rights by indigenous population groups, notably in Raposa 
Serra do Sol (2009).114 Less restricted land rights have been granted in other 
jurisdictions, even in those that have not acquired new constitutions since the approval 
of ILO 169. In Peru, the Constitutional Court has affirmed the land rights of indigenous 
communities in cases where external companies have claimed extractive powers over 
natural resources.115 Indeed, the Court has indicated that indigenous communities 
possess free-standing judicial competences to determine such cases. In Bolivia, where 
indigenous rights are subject, notionally, to a high degree of entrenchment, land rights 
are covered by a special legal regime, on the grounds that land is essential for the 
survival of indigenous communities. In fact, the Bolivian Constitutional Court has 
construed land rights as essential preconditions for the realization of other, more 
robustly protected rights, such as the right to work and the right to water. Still more 
expansively, it has declared that all persons have a right to inhabit an environment that 
is conducive to a dignified familial and communal life. As a result, it has stated, following 
ILO 169, that the right to a decent living environment means that indigenous 
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communities are entitled to assume free control of their territory, and to assert 
collective ownership of land.116 From an early stage, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
recognized indigenous land rights as protected by rights to collective ownership.117 
 
In most countries in Latin America, land rights of indigenous communities assume 
greatest meaning and importance, not as rights to collective titles, but as rights to 
consultation in matters concerning projects affecting the use of indigenous territories 
and the resources that they contain.  
 
In Brazil, for instance, the Office of the Public Prosecutor has repeatedly emphasized the 
existence of a duty of consultation with indigenous communities in cases in which major 
infrastructural projects have been initiated.118 The Chilean Supreme Court has ruled 
that ILO 169 requires the holding of consultative meetings in every administrative 
proceeding that could affect an indigenous community, and that consultation must give 
real opportunities for communities to influence the execution of a given project.119 In 
Guatemala, the Constitutional Court has found a duty to consult indigenous groups prior 
to commencement of mining works.120 In Peru, the Constitutional Court has followed 
ILO 169 to establish rights to consultation, under state supervision, for indigenous 
communities affected by extractivist initiatives.121 Consultation was also declared 
necessary in Peru in business ventures curtailing access to natural resources for 
indigenous populations.122 In Bolivia, the superior courts have, albeit restrictedly, made 
use of ILO 169 to recognize the formal duty of planners and officials to consult 
indigenous populations in ventures in which minerals and sub-soil resources are to be 
extracted.123 The Colombian Constitutional Court has also ruled that consultation with 
indigenous groups is mandatory when exploitation of resources directly affects the 
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interests of indigenous communities.124 In one case, the Constitutional Court invalidated 
an entire piece of legislation owing to lack of prior consultation with indigenous 
communities.125 
 
Rights to land are clearly of the highest importance for the wellbeing of indigenous 
communities. However, as in other cases, the right of indigenous peoples to collective 
ownership of land is not established as a fully free-standing right in the jurisprudence of 
leading Latin American courts. In fact, this right is commonly defined, in part, through 
connection with other rights, including, in particular, rights of access to vital resources, 
especially water.126 Similarly, rights of consultation in matters relating to land use are of 
the highest importance for indigenous communities. Nonetheless, as acknowledged in 
Latin American courts, these rights are also not of a sui-generis nature. In some 
countries, for example, the right to be consulted is not exclusive to indigenous 
population groups, but has been extended to other groups affected by extractivist 
initiatives. Qualification for such rights can encompass a variety of marginalized groups, 
including river-dwelling communities, and people of African descent.127 Moreover, 
when ascribed specifically to indigenous peoples, the rights to consultation are widely 
patterned on rights that are also granted, less differentially, to other subjects. For 
instance, the Colombian Constitutional Court, which has established strong protection 
for prior consultation, has often defined indigenous groups as ‘subjects of especial 
constitutional protection’.128 However, the Court has constructed the right to 
consultation required by indigenous peoples as one based in more broadly established 
rights of ‘effective participation’, which are strictly guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Additionally, it has described mechanisms for ensuring such rights as ‘analogous to 
those conferred by the legal order’ on other disadvantaged social groups in national 
society.129 In the first instance, therefore, the Court has assigned rights of consultation 
to indigenous peoples, not primarily on grounds of indigeneity, but as a means of 
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compensatory social inclusion. In fact, the establishment of this right in Colombia was 
expressly designed to place indigenous groups in the same legal-political position as 
other political subjects. The Colombian Constitutional Court has also established land 
rights, linked to the right to vida digna, for victims of large-scale evictions who are not 
indigenous.130  
 
In sum, the right of indigenous communities to gain access to, and protection for, 
communal land is not a fully free-standing right in Latin American societies. Notably, the 
most robust protection is given, not to land ownership in the strict sense, but to rights 
of consultation regarding construction activities, mining, and other processes of 
resource extraction conducted in indigenous territories. Moreover, these rights are 
rarely defined in absolute terms. As discussed, they are often analogous to participatory 
rights granted to other social groups and to members of other public bodies. They are 
also often founded, in essence, on an expansionary reading of more generally protected 
rights, such as the right to life, or the right to resources required for subsistence. 
Further, few such rights are allocated to indigenous groups on the basis of categorically 
distinct or generic attributes. Indeed, the dominant lines of judicial reasoning suggest 
that such rights are most securely protected, not where they are based in indigeneity, 
but where they are defined and interpreted in conjunction with more widely 
established rights.  
 
5.1.2.2 Rights to exercise communal justice  
As mentioned, many constitutions in Latin America contain clauses that provide for 
comprehensive rights of legal and political autonomy for indigenous communities. 
Important in this regard, however, is the fact that, in comparison to protection for 
(broadly defined) property rights, rights permitting active self-determination by 
indigenous groups are normally subject to limiting interpretation by Latin American 
courts.131 Active indigenous rights, exercisable through patterns of judicial 
independence not sanctioned under primary subjective rights, are usually quite strictly 
circumscribed. In this regard, as a result, widely guaranteed indigenous rights do not 
differ substantially from common civil rights.  
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This becomes visible, first, in rights of judicial self-administration. As mentioned above, 
a number of domestic constitutions in Latin America formally permit the exercise of 
judicial autonomy by indigenous communities, in some cases allowing the institution of 
special courts to address communal legal problems. In some cases, these provisions 
have been modified by subsequent statutes. In Bolivia, statutory norms regarding 
indigenous justice are restrictive, prohibiting the application of customary indigenous 
laws in all cases with implications for criminal law or human rights law.132 More 
generally, however, rights to autonomous exercise of judicial authority by indigenous 
peoples are realized in relevant rulings of superior ordinary courts, which supervise 
judicial procedures in indigenous communities. In particular, cases concerning 
indigenous justice are normally brought before superior courts when they concern 
conflicts between indigenous justice and national law, or – more importantly – when 
they reflect conflicts between indigenous justice and international law, especially in the 
administration of criminal penalties. Notably, in most Latin American states, national 
human rights law is officially aligned to international human rights standards, as 
defined either by the UN or by the ACHR and the jurisprudence of the IACtHR.133 This 
means that, in cases of conflict, international law, especially ILO 169, is used both to 
protect indigenous rights and, equally, to place formal limits on the judicial powers that 
can be assumed by indigenous populations. 
 
The relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court in Colombia are illuminating in this 
regard. From an early stage, the Court established an influential framework for the 
exercise of indigenous autonomy. This framework is based expressly in the assumption 
that international norms regarding indigenous peoples, especially ILO 169, are to be 
interpreted as forming part of domestic constitutional law (the block of 
constitutionality).134  At one level, the Court has adopted a policy of maximization in 
addressing indigenous judicial rights. It has argued that ‘a high degree of autonomy’ is a 
precondition for the survival of indigenous communities, and that ‘maximization of the 
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autonomy of indigenous communities’ and ‘minimization of the restrictions’ imposed on 
the exercise of such autonomy should be viewed as a rule in relevant jurisprudence.135 
At the same time, the Court has determined that indigenous judicial liberties have to be 
limited in cases in which they conflict with a small ‘essential nucleus’ of rights that 
possess obvious higher-order standing in Colombian constitutional law as a whole, and 
which also form part of the block of constitutionality: that is, with the right to life, the 
right not to be tortured, the right to due process, and minimal rights of subsistence.136 In 
Colombia, therefore, judges addressing cases in which the exercise of indigenous self-
determination has engendered conflicts with other high-ranking rights have applied 
standards of proportionality – of ‘rational evaluation’ – to assess which of the conflicting 
rights should ‘enjoy greater weight’.137 In such cases, the national courts have typically 
used international laws, including ILO 169, not only to uphold indigenous judicial 
autonomy, but also to define the extent of its legitimate reach.138 The courts have shown 
some flexibility and leeway in this process.139 Yet, where a clear conflict occurs between 
national-constitutional or international norms and indigenous law, the rights 
established in the former have been accorded indubitable primacy. The principle of 
maximization in Colombian constitutional law, therefore, is used both to establish 
preconditions for legal pluralism, and, in so doing, to harden existing general rights in 
their application to indigenous communities. Nonetheless, it does not create new rights, 
which can be exercised outside overarching human rights frameworks.  
 
These principles have been replicated in other countries with large pre-national 
populations. In a very important case in Guatemala, for example, the Supreme Court has 
given immediate effect to provisions for indigenous justice under ILO 169, and it has 
attributed greater authority to indigenous justice than to rulings handed down by 
ordinary courts. In so doing, however, it has carefully interpreted ILO 169 in 
conjunction with international human rights instruments, especially the ACHR, and it 
has ensured that the domestic primacy granted to indigenous law is framed by 
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137 Ibid.  
138 ILO 169 Article 8(2) states that the exercise of rights of autonomy by indigenous groups is restricted by human 
rights law, supra note 18. 
139 See Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision T-254/94.  




international norms.140 In Bolivia, the Constitutional Court has declared that indigenous 
authorities can deliver their own justice, but the Court retains the duty to oversee 
indigenous jurisdictions and to preserve the supremacy of constitutional and 
fundamental rights.141 Broadly, the Bolivian courts have endeavoured, theoretically, to 
promote a pluralistic method of inter-cultural constitutional review for addressing 
potential asymmetries between indigenous norms and national-constitutional or 
international law. This approach acknowledges the pluralism of the Bolivian domestic 
legal order as a ‘founding element of the state’, and it both sanctions and actively 
attempts to preserve the co-existence of multiple systems of justice within the national 
polity.142 Simultaneously, however, this approach dictates that national courts in Bolivia 
must act to guarantee that the exercise of indigenous customs is circumscribed by, and, 
in cases of conflict, subordinate to, higher-ranking constitutional rights, including 
internationally defined norms. In the Bolivian setting, courts assume a distinctively 
pivotal role within the multi-focal legal order of society, and they are ascribed 
responsibility for the ‘weighing up’ of the rights and claims inscribed in the different 
legal domains in society.143 Such acts of weighing up are formally defined as part of the 
courts’ constitutional obligation to promote general societal conditions of ‘living well’ 
(vivir bien) – that is, to bring harmony to relations between different ethnic groups in 
Bolivian society.144 Primarily, however, this method is underpinned by the assumption 
that international human rights law possesses a basic normative primacy, and it only 
permits marginal or proportionate divergence of indigenous legal processes from 
higher-ranking human rights norms.145  
 
5.1.2.3 Rights to political self-legislation 
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Rights to political self-government by indigenous communities are also widely subject 
to judicial restriction under national-constitutional law and international norms, even 
in states that ostensibly grant far-reaching political autonomy to indigenous peoples.  
 
By way of example, in Colombia, the Constitutional Court has established broad 
normative parameters to ensure legislative autonomy for indigenous communities. 
However, it has also declared that any such autonomy is constitutionally limited by 
fundamental rights defined in international law, including the ACHR.146 Striking 
illustrations of this limiting approach can be found in Bolivia. As mentioned, the 2009 
Constitution of Bolivia provides for the eventual establishment of fully autonomous 
indigenous regions (autonomías). In this regard, the Constitution states (Art 304 I(1)) 
that, as a condition of recognition, aspiring autonomías must draft a founding statute, 
which must be scrutinized by the Constitutional Court, and ultimately declared  in 
accordance with constitutional law. This process implicitly subjects indigenous 
autonomías to the normative hierarchy of domestic laws, which includes international 
human rights law. In fact, the Statute of the first Bolivian autonomía, in Charagua, 
clearly reflects this founding principle, and it specifically defines indigenous self-
governance institutions as elements within an overarching constitutional system, which 
integrates domestic constitutional law and international human rights law. At one level, 
this Statute notes that the creation of the autonomía gives effect to international law, 
especially to ILO 169. However, it recognizes all obligations arising from Bolivia’s 
international treaties (Arts 13 and Art 29), so that the powers of the autonomía in 
Charagua are unquestionably subordinate to international legal norms. In deciding on 
the compatibility of the Statute of Charagua with the constitution, then, the 
Constitutional Court declared that any formal recognition of the autonomía as a self-
governing region presupposes its adherence to constitutional law and international law. 
In fact, in this ruling, the Court recognized the importance of ILO 169 and the UN 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights for indigenous autonomy under Bolivian law. But it 
also stated, as a matter of form, that ‘indigenous autonomy must be subordinate, not 
only to ratified treaties and conventions that address indigenous peoples, but also to 
ratified treaties and conventions that address the nation more widely’.147 By 
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implication, the Court declared that the autonomous powers of the Charagua 
community were both constituted and circumscribed by norms of international law, and 
they were legitimated by a balance between different international-legal provisions.148 
 
In these respects, it becomes evident that, even in states granting high levels of 
autonomy to indigenous groups, the collective judicial and political rights of indigenous 
communities in Latin America are subject to strict inner-legal control. Tellingly, the 
political powers of indigenous groups are habitually determined through the use of the 
principle of proportionality. That is to say, the exercise of autonomous powers by such 
communities is considered permissible to the degree that it does not disproportionately 
conflict with domestic human rights law and international human rights law.149 To this 
extent, the powers of indigenous communities are constructed by principles of public 
law that, with slightly less latitude, also apply to other public-legal entities.  
 
5.1.2.4 Definition of indigeneity 
At a formal level, as can be seen, many Latin American courts have developed a clear 
construction of indigenous peoples as distinct legal subjects. In Colombia, for example, 
the Constitutional Court has declared that indigenous communities form a distinct 
‘collective subject’, which cannot simply be viewed as the sum of ‘individual subjects 
that share the same rights or diffuse or collective interests’.150 In Bolivia, similarly, the 
courts have defined indigenous populations as ‘collective legal subjects’,151 endowed 
with rights that warrant differential protection or particularly robust guarantees.152  
 
Beneath the level of formal legality, however, the construction of indigenous groups as 
legal subjects in Latin American societies does not radically alter the parameters of 
national constitutional law or international human rights law. Tellingly, the concept of 
differential recognition has been established in a period of time in which a growing 
range of subjects has been granted intensified protection in their basic rights. In 
Colombia, for example, differential protection has been extended to include displaced 
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populations, and, within such groups, it has been still further intensified for women and 
children.153 Differential protection for such groups has been widely supported through 
citation of international human rights and humanitarian law.154 
 
The legal indistinctiveness of the category of indigeneity in Latin America is most 
clearly underlined by the fact that the title of indigeneity, and attendant cultural rights, 
can be claimed by many persons, and indigenous rights are not firmly correlated with 
objectively identifiable attributes. Importantly, courts in many countries have replicated 
international guidelines in emphasizing the significance of self-identification as the basic 
determinant of indigeneity. The Colombian Constitutional Court has followed ILO 169 in 
declaring ‘self-identification’ the main standard for determining indigeneity.155 In one 
Bolivian case, it was decided that the self-identification of legal claimants as indigenous 
is the ‘essential element and the point of departure for such peoples’.156 In consequence, 
a variety of different organizations, including peasant groups, and neighbourhood 
collectives, have been able to lay claim to indigeneity, or at least to the entitlement to 
collective rights.157 Moreover, importantly, indigenous population groups in Bolivia 
often designate themselves in multiple categories, not all of which clearly prioritize 
ethnic membership. For example, different indigenous communities in Bolivia 
categorize themselves formally as ‘naciones originarias’ (original nations), ‘pueblos 
indígenas’ (indigenous peoples), and ‘naciones originarias campesinas’ (original peasant 
nations), each of which terms implies claims to ethnic unity of varying intensity. Very 
notably, in fact, the autonomía in Charagua, which is, nationally, the first fully self-
governing indigenous region created under the Bolivian Constitution of 2009 and, 
globally, the first such community created under ILO 169, is not characterized by ethnic 
homogeneity. In addition to members of the majority Guarani community, Charagua 
comprises large numbers of Mennonites of German descent, as well as Aymaras and 
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Quechuas who have migrated from the Bolivian uplands.158 This community is founded, 
not in uniform patterns of ethnic subjectivity, but in inter-group agreements (‘pactos 
sociales’), which are partly defined by and reflect international norms.159 The legal 
subjectivity of indigeneity, consequently, is not be confused with indigeneity as a 
material fact. Instead, it is one part of a broad mass of claims, linking a range of 
interconnected subjects, which are articulated as global legal norms penetrate into 
national society. 
 
Overall, indigenous rights in the national case law of Latin American states are not 
generically distinct from other rights, and they do not rest on clearly distinct 
foundations. The extent to which these rights are attributed to uniquely defined 
subjects is limited. In fact, rights claimed as rights pertaining to indigenous peoples are 
often constructed through processes, for which indigeneity is not a primary 
determinant. The primary impetus behind the hardening of indigenous rights is that 
human rights jurisprudence more generally is in a process of global expansion, largely 
owing to a heightened interaction between national and international law. On this basis, 
the construction of indigenous rights in the region depends, not on the demands of 
objective societal subjects, but on articulations between different levels of the global 
legal system. These articulations naturally create openings in which subjects that wish 
to be identified as indigenous can effectively mobilize for rights. Yet, the substance of 
these rights is largely generated through amplification of rights that have already been 
developed in the global legal system, and which, in principle, are justiciable for many 
subjects. In most cases, globally defined rights underpin a system of rights within 
national law, widening these rights so that national legal bodies can attach uniform 
rights to a growing range of claimants in national society, linking groups with distinct 
structural and ethnic affiliations to a single normative system. The key sociological 
outcome of this is that national law acquires a dramatically extended capacity for the 
integration of different actors in society, it penetrates more deeply into national society, 
and it obtains heightened inclusivity across society. 
                                                          
158 See discussion in Wilfredo Plata, ‘Charagua: El autogobierno Guaraní Iyambae’ in José Luis Exeni Rodríguez, ed, 
La larga marcha (La Paz: FRL, 2015). 
159 Interview conducted with Gonzalo Vargas, Vice-Minister for Autonomous Indigenous Communities of Bolivia, 
6th of April of 2016 
 





5.2 Municipal Human Rights Law in Africa 
4.2.1 Constitutional and Statutory Law  
As at the regional international level, constitutional and statutory protection for rights 
of indigenous communities in African states is less substantial than in Latin America. 
Few African constitutions make strict and express provision for the protection of 
particular indigenous peoples. One obvious reason for this is that, traditionally, some 
African constitutions were expected to support a dominant ethnic elite. More recently, 
in some cases, democratic constitutions have been written against an unsettling 
backdrop of inter-ethnic conflict. Consequently, the authors of African constitutions 
have endeavoured to promote an expressly national legal order above the fissures 
between rival population groups.160 Nonetheless, indigenous rights are recognized in 
the Preamble to the constitution of Cameroon and in Articles 6 and 148 of the 2015 
Constitution of the Central African Republic. Other constitutions, such as those of Mali, 
Burundi, and South Africa, provide more general protection for indigenous groups, 
especially under clauses and declarations acknowledging rights of linguistic, cultural 
and epistemic diversity.161 The Ethiopian Constitution is based in a model of tripartite 
power-sharing ethno-federalism, which gives clear powers of autonomy to ethnic 
groups with dominant status in given regions.162 More generally, however, African 
constitutions only give subsidiary recognition to indigenous rights, and many 
constitutions actively promote a legal order based in trans-population unity.163   
 
Naturally, this is not to say that indigenous rights are not defended in the municipal law 
of African polities. In fact, many constitutions offer distinctive openings for the claims of 
indigenous peoples. This is often visible, for example, in laws regarding health-care 
access, land management, and environmental protection.164 Also, in many cases, 
protective provisions for minorities implicitly cover indigenous peoples. For instance, 
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the Kenyan Constitution (2010) does not specifically protect indigenous peoples, yet it 
prescribes affirmative action for minorities and marginalized groups (Art 56). In many 
African societies, further, the collective rights of indigenous communities are quite 
broadly protected under constitutional and statutory provisions relating to customary 
law.165 Significant examples of this are Kenya,166 and South Africa (1996 Constitution, 
Articles 211-212). Also exemplary in this respect is the 1992 Constitution of Ghana,167 
where several ethnic groups, for instance the Akans, the Mole-Dagbani, the Ewe, and the 
Ga-Dangme, co-exist. The 1992 Constitution (Art 273) established the National House of 
Chiefs, which has appellate jurisdiction in matters affecting chieftaincy. Moreover, rights 
to ethnic and cultural identity and ethnic legal thought and practice are construed as an 
inherent part of the Ghanaian legal system. In Article 11(3), the Constitution recognizes 
and supports patterns of customary law in Ghana as practiced and applied by the 
various ethnic groups. Important in this regard is the fact that ethnic rights relating to 
land ownership are constitutionally protected.168  
 
5.2.2 Jurisprudence of superior courts 
Alongside such examples of generic recognition, courts in different African countries 
have also, in recent years, shown acceptance of indigeneity as a premise for specific 
legal rights, especially in land cases. In Botswana, courts have declared that there exists 
a distinct ‘class of peoples’, which is formed by indigenous groups, and which can lay 
claim to particular rights.169 The recognition of indigeneity as a foundation for distinct 
rights has been expressed more emphatically in South Africa, where, in a leading series 
of cases, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court acknowledged that 
indigenous customary law provides a basis for collective rights.170 In these cases, the 
Constitutional Court stated unequivocally ‘that the Constitution acknowledges the 
originality and distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms 
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within the legal system’.171 Indeed, in these cases, it was ruled that, for pastoralist 
communities, not even fixed and permanent inhabitation is required as a precondition 
for the assertion of legal rights: indigeneity can create a quite distinctive legal 
personality.172 Kenyan courts have at times been reluctant to establish rights for 
indigenous groups.173 In notable cases, however, judges in Kenya have decided that 
persons forming an ‘indigenous and distinct community’ possess a collective 
personality, entailing ‘attendant rights and protections’.174 Kenyan courts have also 
opted to recognize the principle, promoted by the IACtHR, that ‘the distinguishing factor 
for indigenous communities is their historical ties to a particular territory’.175 On this 
basis, the Kenyan courts have adopted a moderately protective approach towards land 
claims made by indigenous groups.  
 
Although not elevated to the same degree of constitutional protection as in Latin 
America, therefore, indigeneity is surely emerging in domestic law in African states as a 
qualification for collective legal personality and collective rights. This applies in 
particular to rights to land.176 Moreover, African jurisprudence in these questions has 
begun to reflect global tendencies, and it displays a strong articulation between national 
and global law. As discussed below, the jurisprudential analysis of indigeneity in African 
societies resembles Latin American models in that the rights ascribed to indigenous 
groups are mainly constructed through an expansive interpretation of other rights. In 
many cases, rights are generated for indigenous communities because of the distinctive 
deprivations which they suffer, and the actual quality of indigeneity is relatively 
marginal to the legal outcome. As in Latin America, indigenous rights in Africa typically 
result from a wider set of legal constructions, and their correlation with materially 
distinct legal subjects is uncertain.   
 
5.2.2.1 Rights to land, life and resources  
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In the leading cases concerning indigenous rights in Africa, particularly those 
addressing land rights, such rights are usually extracted, not from distinctive features of 
the subjects concerned, but from other primary rights, especially the right to life, and 
from the right to resources (often water) connected to, or acting as a precondition for, 
the right to life. For example, in the first Botswanan cases establishing indigenous 
rights, rights to land for the San people were construed as inseparable from rights to 
vital resources.177 Tellingly, this case was partly decided through reference to the UN’s 
recognition of a right to water in 2010 (Resolution 64/292), and partly through 
interpretation of the African Charter. In the Kenyan High Court, indigenous land rights 
have been established through their conjunction with the right to live in dignity and the 
right to live in a healthy environment.178 In other Kenyan cases, the courts have found 
that the rights to life, dignity and economic and social rights of indigenous communities 
had been infringed through land allocations and by their enforced removal from 
historically occupied territories.179 In these cases, indigenous land rights were 
established on grounds having little to do with indigeneity. The right to life, rather than 
any right distinctively inherent in indigeneity, formed the basis for guarantees for land 
rights.   
 
Notable in such cases, moreover, is the fact that the rights to land ascribed to indigenous 
communities do not have a strictly unique status. To some degree, these cases reflect a 
more general amplification of the right to life in African law.180 In a number of African 
societies, similar combinations of rights to land and rights to life, partly derived from 
international sources, have been established to settle cases in which other collective 
marginalized subjects have claimed damages.181 In fact, in many societies, non-
indigenous subjects have experienced the violations that typically afflict indigenous 
populations, and their claims have been resolved on similar grounds, providing 
entitlement to similar rights.  
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By way of exemplification, the Kenyan courts have heard a number of legal cases 
involving the large-scale displacement of non-indigenous or mixed-provenance 
communities. In these cases, evicted communities have usually been exposed to land 
deprivations similar to those suffered by indigenous groups. In such cases, courts have 
widely relied on the same principles used in cases concerning indigenous groups, and 
they have sought to protect evicted communities by enforcing ‘internationally 
recognized human rights standards’, including ‘the right to dignity, life and security’.182 
In a leading Kenyan High Court case, it was judged that large-scale eviction forms an 
unconstitutional action towards those affected by it because it ‘robs them of their 
dignity, jeopardizes their right to health, and threatens their right to life’.183 In similar 
cases in South Africa, the courts have seen fit to cite ‘the right to human dignity and the 
right to life’ as a means to obstruct evictions.184  
 
Overall, indigenous rights in Africa are widely consonant with rights generally accorded 
to other systematically marginalized subjects. The actual fact of indigeneity is not a fully 
material legal determinant of these rights.   
 
5.2.2.2 Right to judicial autonomy and political self-legislation  
As in Latin America, African legal systems are reluctant to extend protection for 
indigenous rights to include free-standing rights of political and judicial autonomy. This 
is visible, first, in the constitutional texts of many African states, which, in provisions for 
regional or local government, clearly dictate that such powers can only be exercised 
within the normative order of the constitution. This is evident in Article 2(4) of the 
Kenyan Constitution, Article 39(2) of the Constitution of South Africa and Articles 26(2) 
and 39(2) of the Constitution of Ghana. Moreover, in African legal systems that allow 
latitude in the application of customary law, there is a strong tendency for courts to 
apply international human rights law as a means to control the autonomy of customary 
law.185 Key examples of the limits imposed on customary law can be provided from 
South Africa, whose Constitution (Art 211(3)) recognizes customary law as part of the 
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domestic constitutional order. This is evidenced by one of the most famous cases in 
recent African history, the South African death-penalty case, S v Makwanyane and 
Another (1995).186  
 
In this case, first, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that South African society 
contains multiple legal orders, in the context of which ‘indigenous value systems’ should 
act as a key premise for the development of domestic public law.187 Second, the Court 
stated that the recognition of indigenous law as part of the plurality of legal values in 
South African society meant that such law must always be subject to certain strict and 
necessary normative limits, and indigenous law should not be accorded authority that 
exceeds the fundamental rights provisions in the constitution.188 On this basis, further, 
the Court decided that, in order continuously to develop customary law, the 
Constitution ‘requires courts to proceed to public international law and foreign case law 
for guidance in constitutional interpretation’, implying that international law can help 
to promote ‘the cultivation of a human rights jurisprudence for South Africa’.189 As a 
result, the Court affirmed indigenous law and international law at the same time, 
arguing that legal reasoning fusing the two legal domains should form the primary 
foundation for South African law. Although not employing international human rights 
law to suppress indigenous law, the Court clearly set out a construction of international 
human rights law as an overarching order, within which indigenous law had to be 
interpreted, elaborated, and refined.  
 
In Africa, provisions for the political autonomy of indigenous communities are also 
constrained by higher legal norms. To be sure, we can find judicial rulings that uphold 
political rights for indigenous communities. However, such rulings usually promote 
adequate integration of indigenous communities within national systems of 
representation. An important example is the Kenyan High Court case, Rangal 
Lemeiguran & Others v Attorney General & Others (2006), regarding the claim of the Il 
Chamus people that their fundamental political rights had been denied by the fact that 
they were not recognized as a special interest group, entitled to distinct political 
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representation during elections. In this instance, the Court found that sufficient 
evidence had been provided that the community formed ‘a unique cohesive 
homogenous and a cultural distinct minority’, proudly displaying ‘all the attributes of 
the internationally recognized indigenous peoples’.190 Then, despite the fact that this 
instrument had not been incorporated, the Court relied directly on ILO 169 in deciding 
that ‘[r]epresentation is a clear constitutional recognition of a positive right of the 
minority – to participate in the State’s political process and influence State policies’.191 
On these grounds, the Court determined that the Il Chamus should have the right to be 
represented as a collective subject in the national political system. At no point, however, 
was it implied in this case that the distinct status of the Il Chamus could provide 
entitlement for special rights outside the national political order. On the contrary, the 
ruling was intended to extend generally sanctioned political rights to the Il Chamus. In 
this case, the Court constructed a definition of ‘indigenous’ that was, in essence, 
synonymous with ‘minority community’.192 
 
In these key instances, the extent to which indigenous communities in Africa can claim 
distinct judicial or political rights remains limited. Overall, indigenous rights in Africa 
resemble those in Latin America in that they are not primarily attached to sui-generis 
models of legal subjectivity, and they are not substantially different from other rights. 
They result mainly from interactions between national and international levels of the 
legal system, and in most concrete cases, they are produced through adaptive 
interpretation of already existing rights.  
 
6. Agency of indigeneity 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature in the legal construction of indigeneity is not the 
concrete rights that are attached to it, but rather the legal practices and patterns of legal 
mobilization that often accompany it. One of the most salient points in the rise of 
indigenous rights, in fact, is that such law is configured by new patterns of collective 
advocacy, and it reflects the recognition, visible in many societies, that non-classical 
legal representatives can pursue legal claims, and that such actors can play a role in the 
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expansion of rights, and even in the creation of new constitutional laws.  The 
importance of litigation as a form of political participation is strongly reflected in some 
theories of pluralism.193  
 
To illustrate this, first, the fact that persons claiming indigenous rights are usually 
located in marginal social positions often means that subjects filing suit to assert such 
rights stand outside conventional legal categorizations, and cases are initiated by a 
broad array of legal actors. This is particularly the case because such proceedings often 
involve representation of interests of groups who do not have extensive legal 
knowledge, and lack access to standard legal resources. In consequence of this, many 
cases regarding indigenous interests have been instigated by proxies, in particular by 
human rights organizations or designated organs of the state. Striking examples of this 
are found in leading African cases, in which, in some instances, the authority of the 
given proxy to take the case has been challenged, and courts have strategically adopted 
wide rules on locus standi to permit litigation for indigenous communities.194 Most 
significantly, however, the Colombian Constitutional Court has repeatedly applied 
Article 2304 of the Colombian Civil Code to allow the representation of indigenous 
groups by proxies, even without formal knowledge of the affected communities 
themselves (that is – by agencia oficiosa). In such cases, the Court has ruled that ‘lack of 
legal knowledge, economic incapacity, and linguistic limitations’, all of which may 
constitute an impediment to effective filing of suit by indigenous persons, can provide 
justification for an unknown proxy to take a case to court.195 In Peru, NGOs have also 
been given standing to represent indigenous groups without their knowledge.196 
 
Equally importantly, many cases regarding indigenous rights are brought to court 
through public interest litigation. This is evident in African cases, many of which, in 
broad terms, can be categorized as examples of public interest litigation.197 In some 
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Latin American countries, provisions for public interest litigation are strictly formalized 
in domestic law, and litigation of this kind is clearly identified as a strategy for 
representing and reinforcing rights of indigenous population groups. In Colombia, 
collective tutelas (direct human rights petitions) have been identified as an effective 
procedure for representation of indigenous communities. The Constitutional Court has 
formally stated that tutelas offer the most robust ‘judicial defense mechanism’ for 
protecting rights of indigenous population groups.198 However, more conventional 
patterns of public interest litigation, filed through the administrative courts and 
referred ultimately to the Consejo de Estado (Council of State, the Supreme 
Administrative Court in Colombia), have been used in attempts to defend the more 
diffuse rights and interests of indigenous groups, such as the right to an intact 
environment.199 In fact, the Colombian Constitutional Court has declared that the public 
interest suit is a singularly appropriate means to consolidate the general rights of 
indigenous communities.200 In Bolivia, public interest litigation has acquired particular 
importance for the protection of indigenous populations. In one ruling, the 
Constitutional Court stated that public interest litigation is an especially adequate 
method for asserting the rights of indigenous and peasant peoples.201 The main reason 
for this, the Court declared, is that public interest proceedings are often marked by 
procedural flexibility, which means that such litigation provides a channel of access to 
the court for groups for whom the legal system was traditionally alienating or 
forbidding. However, a further reason for this is that many cases concerning indigenous 
rights refer to diffuse interests, such as the right to culture or to a healthy environment, 
which are only weakly protected under the constitution, and which are more effectively 
litigated on a public interest basis than on grounds of particular subjective damages. In 
Bolivia, consequently, public interest cases have assumed singular importance in 
articulating the rights of indigenous groups, ranging from particular rights to self-
administration and to residence in ancestral territory,202 to more diffuse rights to 
cultural development, to spirituality, and to control of natural resources.203 
Significantly, many relevant public interest cases in Bolivia have expressly entailed a 
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linkage between domestic claims and international legal provisions, such that courts 
have used international law to define indigenous rights.204  
  
In most jurisdictions that have given elevated recognition to indigenous rights, 
consequently, this process has been partly driven by atypical, collective patterns of 
litigation, by non-classical forms of legal representation, and by non-traditional legal 
procedures. In this respect again, however, it is important to observe the rise of 
indigenous rights as one part of a broader aggregate of legal-systemic processes. On one 
hand, the correlation between indigenous rights and public interest cases has occurred 
in a wider social constellation in which rules on locus standi have generally been subject 
to relaxation, and litigation over diffuse or collective rights has been actively 
encouraged.205 On the other hand, the methods used for domestic representation of 
indigenous groups do not usually differ substantially from strategies deployed to 
protect the interests of other marginalized communities. Cases involving groups or 
subjects, such as evictees or displaced persons, who are exposed to violations 
commonly experienced by indigenous groups, have also quite typically involved the use 
of proxies and public interest litigators.206 As a result, indigenous rights cases often 
exemplify a growing trend towards the de-formalization of litigation procedures and the 
promotion of public interest litigation, in which widened rules on standing generally 
facilitate the defence of vulnerable minorities and the construction of collective rights. 
In each respect, the formation of new patterns of legal agency amongst advocacy groups 
mirrors a wider legal process, and it does not indicate recognition of indigenous groups 
or their advocates as sui-generis legal subjects. In each instance, the emergence of new 
modes of legal agency reflects the societal extension of the legal system, creating 
categories for the effective integration of historically marginalized societal actors in the 
legal order.  
 
7. Conclusion: Rephrasing indigeneity  
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The idea that indigenous communities possess a distinctive legal personality, to which 
distinctive rights are attached, is becoming widespread, in practice and in theory. This is 
clearly established in rulings of the IACtHR, where it has been argued that indigenous 
communities possess a unique collective legal personality, in which the ‘collective rights 
of the community’ are separate from the single, individuated rights of its members. On 
this basis, members of indigenous communities are seen as possessing two distinct legal 
personalities, one as a collective and one as an aggregate of individual persons, both of 
which ‘are subject to protection and require specific measures of protection’.207 At a 
domestic level, this recognition is perhaps most advanced in Colombian 
jurisprudence.208 However, this phenomenon is now increasingly reflected across Latin 
America and Africa.  
 
As discussed, the recognition of the personality of indigenous peoples is usually 
accompanied by a construction of society that identifies a plurality of legal regimes 
existing alongside each other, so that the legal subjectivity of indigenous communities is 
defined through reference to materially existent communities in society. Accordingly, 
mobilization of indigenous groups is habitually identified as the expression of plural, 
sectoral citizenship, designed to ensure that a given set of social practices is covered by 
rights,  usually opposed to formal legal order.  However, this pluralistic characterization 
of indigenous communities as free-standing legal subjects tends slightly to blur the 
actual legal reality of indigenous communities. Moreover, it obscures the fact that the 
assumption of legal subjectivity by indigenous groups is part of a wider process of legal 
subject construction, in which many collective legal subjects are able to claim new 
rights.209 Overall, the pluralistic construction of indigenous rights appears both 
sociologically and jurisprudentially under-reflected. To overcome this, it is necessary to 
place the distinctive qualities which are imputed to indigeneity as a source of legal 
personality in a broad global legal context. On the account set out above, indigenous 
communities do not possess a hard reality outside the rights to which they lay claim. In 
fact, legal claims usually strip indigenous legal communities out from their factual 
collective form, such that indigenous rights are constructed, not by society’s external 
                                                          
207 See Plan de Sánchez, supra note 65. 
208 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Decision T-769/09.  
209 These include, as discussed, displaced persons, evictees, and marginalized social groups. See also Saul, Indigenous 
Peoples and Human Rights, supra note 31, placing indigenous rights on a continuum with other minority rights.  




legal pluralism, but by the internal expansion and the growing inclusivity of the law. As 
a result, the establishment of indigenous rights leads, not to the fragmentation, but to 
the intensification of the legal system of national society. The form of citizenship that 
emerges in cases concerning indigenous rights is not sectoral citizenship;210 it is world 
citizenship, emerging through the differentiation and increasing interlinkage of the 
global legal system. Moreover, this form of citizenship does not challenge the formal 
legal order of society; it reflects its growing inclusivity. The indigenous person assumes 
rights as global law enters national law; in entering national law, global law creates 
new, expansive categories for incorporating different societal actors, and it greatly 
increases the societal penetration of national law. As a result, indigenous rights 
specifically rely on a dynamic of transnational norm and subject formation which is not 
essentially linked to primary social identities and affiliations. 
 
The global preconditions of indigenous rights are most evident in the following ways:  
 
First, the general standing of international human rights law in the global legal system 
means that social demands can be easily addressed, within the law, through 
constructive interpretation of existing rights, and existing rights can easily be widened 
to assimilate new legal demands and new patterns of legal claim. The prominence of 
human rights at the global level of the legal system facilitates legal inclusion of 
pluralistic groups in national society, positioned in marginal positions relative to the 
centre of complex social landscapes. Naturally, this facilitates recognition of, and 
allocation of rights to, indigenous peoples. 
 
Second, the fact that the global legal system is increasingly centred on human rights 
means that the legal system assumes a form, in which the highest systemic principles of 
normative authority are declared at an international level, and subsequently 
internalized within domestic law. As a result, it is increasingly easy for actors in national 
legal systems (i.e. advocates, and judges) to establish authoritative, binding and 
relatively uncontested norms to ascribe rights and to adjudicate questions of legal 
entitlement. Because of this, actors in national legal systems are more easily able to give 
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partial recognition to pluralistic, non-typical, legal subjects, such as indigenous groups. 
On one hand, international law allows national legal actors to attribute rights to 
indigenous subjects in uncontroversial fashion, by borrowing from already established 
normative principles. Yet, on the other hand, international law makes it possible for 
these actors proportionately to limit such rights, also on relatively uncontested 
normative premises, wherever they threaten the consistency of the legal order as a 
whole. The rise of global human rights law thus means that the legal system as a whole 
has evolved to a heightened degree of flexibility and positive inclusivity; it can generate 
rights for different groups in complex societies with growing facility and authority, in 
relatively depoliticized fashion; and it is less likely to be unsettled by particular or 
pluralistic claims to rights. The increasing inclusivity of the legal system has triggered a 
wide expansion of sustainable rights claims and a wide proliferation of non-typical 
collective legal subjects, of which indigenous groups form one important sub-category.  
 
Third, the fact that the legal system is centred, globally, on human rights means that the 
legitimacy of national legal orders is supported by relatively abstracted general norms, 
and national law does not fully presuppose the existence of a homogenous national 
people for its legitimacy. As a result, the primary source of legal authority is moved from 
the national to the international domain, and the national basis of jurisprudence 
becomes less dominant. This means that actors with norm-setting responsibility in 
national legal systems can accept the existence of many different subjects and many 
different sets of rights within society, as the underlying authority of the legal order is 
not affected by the fact that it recognizes multiple rights claimants. In fact, as national 
legal systems support their authority through sources that are no longer specifically 
national, they are able to incorporate their national constituencies, as holders of 
divergent sets of rights, in more complex objective form, and in more pluralistic 
procedural fashion. The construction of indigenous rights reflects this process. In this 
respect, too, the growth of human rights law as a primary determinant of legal validity 
has led to an increase in collectivized legal subjectivity, which is partially exemplified by 
indigenous communities.  
 
Viewed at a macro-sociological level, the emergence of indigeneity as a legal 
construction, defined by new claims to rights, new claims to legal subjectivity, and new 




patterns of litigation, can be seen as a reflection of the increasing inclusivity, and even 
the growing autonomy, of the global legal system as a whole. Rising recognition of a 
plurality of legal subjects and a plurality of legal rights can be viewed as an external 
reflection of the growing penetration of the transnational legal system, which is 
expressed through the fact that, both within and across national boundaries, human 
rights form a dominant source of legal communication and validity, fluidly producing 
new rights in response to new social demands. From a sociological perspective, not legal 
pluralism, but increasing legal inclusivity, underpins the rise of indigenous rights. From a 
sociological viewpoint, moreover, indigenous rights specifically consolidate and extend 
the inclusive force of national law. Such rights incorporate transnational legal norms in 
national legal systems, which greatly reinforce the basic cohesion and integrative power 
of these systems, allowing legal actors to capture indigenous claims in relatively 
uniform processes of norm construction. Quite generally, the growing plurality of rights 
within national societies reflects, not the fragmentation, but the deepening extension of 
the global legal system.     
 
